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Abstract
We investigate the optimal responses of policy authorities through a model where
the fiscal and the monetary policymakers are independent and play strategically.
We allow for the presence of two types of consumers: ‘Ricardians’, who trade in the
assets market and ‘liquidity constrained’ consumers, who spend all their disposable
labor income for consumption. We find that not only the different game structures
but mainly the presence of ‘liquidity constrained’ consumers is crucial in determining
the optimal responses of policies. In particular, for high enough fractions of liquidity
constrained consumers the way policies react to cope with a mark-up shock change
significantly and the role of fiscal policy becomes more relevant.
∗I would like to thank my supervisor Guido Ascari and Lorenza Rossi for helpful comments and
directions.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, many authors concentrated on the issue of heterogeneity of consumers.
In particular, they considered the presence of a fraction of consumers which are liquid-
ity constrained, so that the Ricardian equivalence does not hold anymore. This feature
brought different results on the dynamics of the economic system with respect to the stan-
dard framework. For example, Gal´ı, Lo`pez-Salido and Valle´s (2007) demonstrate that the
presence of liquidity constrained consumers can explain the fact that consumption rises
in response to an increase in government spending. Bilbiie (2008) and Di Bartolomeo and
Rossi (2007) show that limited asset market participation can lead to an inverted aggre-
gate demand logic (the IS curve has a positive slope). Gal´ı, Lo`pez-Salido and Valle´s (2004)
and Bilbiie (2008) found that in such a context, the so called ‘Taylor principle’ could be
also inverted, thus suggesting the relevance of taking into account liquidity constrained
consumers in the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, the estimates of Campbell and
Mankiw (1989) pointed to the presence of a significant fraction of this type of consumers,
which may increase of importance after financial crises.
This study is focused on the strategic interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in
a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model without capital, where distor-
tions are due to monopolistic competition and price stickiness a` la Rotemberg (1982) and
there is limited asset market participation. After considering the Ramsey problem, we
build up a strategic game where there are two policy authorities which are independent
and do not cooperate, following Adam and Billi (2008). On the contrary, most of the
literature which studies the behavior of fiscal and monetary policy assumes that they are
both driven by a unique authority. This is clearly not the case nowadays and in particu-
lar in the EU context, where the creation of the currency area led to a structure with a
unique monetary authority and several independent fiscal authorities. In such a context
it is then relevant to investigate the strategic interactions between the Central Bank and
the fiscal authorities, as done by Gnocchi (2008), Adam and Billi (2008), Beetsma and
Jensen (2007) and many others.
We consider the closed economy model of Adam and Billi (2008) but we allow for hetero-
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geneity of households, as done by Gal´ı, Lo`pez-Salido and Valle´s (2004). In their model
two different kinds of households coexist: ‘assets holders’ or ‘Ricardians’ who are forward
looking, smooth consumption and are able to trade in all markets for state-contingent
securities; and ‘liquidity constrained’ consumers who spend all their current disposable
labor income for consumption at time t. This is an important topic because of its empir-
ical relevance and because it has been shown that it alters the standard results on policy
design.
The literature on liquidity constrained consumers arose from the need to make fiscal
policy have significant effects on the economy. In fact, fiscal policy does not affect real
variables since only Ricardian consumers are taken into account so that the Ricardian
equivalence holds. For example Gal´ı, Lo`pez-Salido and Valle´s (2007) and Colciago (2007)
model public spending as an exogenous variable and consider fiscal policy rules. Other
papers concentrate on monetary policy stance as Gal´ı, Lo`pez-Salido and Valle´s (2004),
Bilbiie (2008), Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007). An optimizing framework of policy de-
sign with fiscal and monetary policy strategic interaction and households heterogeneity
would be new in the literature, up to our knowledge. We will show that this framework
can lead to relevant and different results in comparison with the standard models.
We draw on Adam and Billi (2008) but, after calculating the steady state, we analyze
the dynamics of our model in comparison with their’s, observing the optimal response
of policy variables in face of two kind of shocks (to technology and mark-up). We note
that the presence of ‘liquidity constrained’ consumers can alter the reactions of the policy
authorities and in particular what is remarkable is that the role of fiscal policy is more
relevant, given that it can affect liquidity constrained consumption. This happens mainly
in response to a negative mark-up shock. In fact, in face of such a shock, our model
calls for a reduction of the interest rate and a rise of public spending if there is a unique
committed policy authority (instead of a restrictive monetary policy and a less expan-
sive fiscal policy). When the policy authorities are independent, not committed and play
simultaneously, together with an expansive monetary policy, public spending should be
reduced significantly when there is limited asset market participation. Moreover, when
the monetary authority only cares about inflation and the fiscal authority moves first,
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the monetary authority should be restrictive while an expansive fiscal policy should be
used more with respect to the model of Adam and Billi (2008) to face the mark-up shock.
These are the main results derived from this analysis. Optimal policy reactions change
when there is limited asset market participation and the more are liquidity constrained
consumers the more these responses are different. The relevance of this study lies in the
importance assigned to the presence of limited asset market participation. In fact we
think that liquidity constrained consumers may have assumed an increasingly relevant
role in the economy, due to the recent financial crisis, because of the worsening of the
conditions of access to financial markets. This work provides policy indications for differ-
ent policy structures: policymakers should first realize which is the policy structure which
best describes their economy and secondly carry out the optimal policy needed to cope
with a particular shock.
In the next section we introduce the model, section 3 presents the policy problem and the
different game structures, in section 4 we show the results from the welfare analysis and
section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Households
The model economy consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived households. Households
are divided into a fraction 1 − λ of ‘Ricardians’ who smooth consumption and have ac-
cess to assets markets; the remaining fraction λ are the so called ‘liquidity constrained’
consumers who have no assets and spend all their current disposable labor income for
consumption each period. Both types of households have the same preferences structure.
The utility functions for Ricardians and rule for thumb consumers are then respectively:
u(Cot , N
o
t , Gt) =
Cot
1−σ
1− σ
− ωn
Not
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ ωg
Gt
1−σ
1− σ
(1)
u(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) =
Crt
1−σ
1− σ
− ωn
N rt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ ωg
Gt
1−σ
1− σ
, (2)
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where Cot , N
o
t are Ricardian consumer’s consumption and hours worked, C
r
t , N
r
t are liquid-
ity constrained consumer’s consumption and hours worked and Gt is public expenditure.
Utility is separable in C, N, G and Uc > 0, Ucc < 0, Un < 0, Unn ≤ 0, Ug > 0, Ugg < 0.
Ricardians’ budget constraint is:
PtC
o
t +
Bt
1− λ
= Rt−1
Bt−1
1− λ
+ PtwtN
o
t − PtT
o
t +
Dt
1− λ
, (3)
where Pt is the nominal price index, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, Bt are nominal
bonds purchased in t and maturing in t+1, wt is the real wage paid in a competitive labor
market, T ot are lump sum taxes and Dt are profits of monopolistic firms.
The Ricardians’ problem consists of choosing {Cot , N
o
t , Bt}
∞
t=0 to maximize
E0
∑
∞
t=0 β
tu(Cot , N
o
t , Gt) subject to (3), taking as given {Pt, wt, Rt, Gt, Tt, Dt}
1. The first
order conditions are then:
ωnN
o
t
ϕ
Cot
−σ = wt (4)
Cot
−σ
Rt
= βEt
Cot+1
−σ
πt+1
. (5)
Liquidity constrained consumers each period solve a static problem: they maximize their
period utility (2) subject to the constraint that all their labor income is consumed:
PtC
r
t = PtwtN
r
t − PtT
r
t . (6)
From the first order conditions we get:
ωnN
r
t
ϕ
Crt
−σ = wt . (7)
Note that there is a common labor market, so that the real wage is the same for both
consumers. This leads to the following condition:
ωnN
o
t
ϕ
Cot
−σ =
ωnN
r
t
ϕ
Crt
−σ , (8)
1The no-Ponzi scheme constraint limj→∞ Et
∏t+j−1
i=0
1
Rt
Bt+j ≥ 0 and the transversality condition
limj→∞ Etβ
t+jCot+j
−σBt+j/Pt+j = 0 hold.
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which equals the ratio between the marginal utilities of Ricardian and liquidity constrained
consumers respectively.
The aggregate consumption and hours worked are defined as follows:
Ct = λC
r
t + (1− λ)C
o
t (9)
Nt = λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t . (10)
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and a sector of final
good which uses the following technology:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
ǫt−1
ǫt dj
] ǫt
ǫt−1
. (11)
The sector of final good operates in perfect competition. Then profit maximization im-
plies Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−ǫt
Yt, where ǫt represents the elasticity of substitution across varieties
and is assumed to be an AR(1) process log (ǫt/ǫ) = ρǫ log (ǫt−1/ǫ) + s
ǫ
t, with 0 < ρǫ < 1
and sǫt normally distributed innovation with zero mean and standard deviation σǫ. ǫt is
time-varying, thus induces fluctuations in the monopolistic mark-up charged by firms. Pt
is defined as follows:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−ǫtdi
] 1
1−ǫt
. (12)
The intermediate good sector is characterized by firms producing each a differentiated
good with a technology represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function with a unique
factor of production (aggregate labor) and constant returns to scale:
Yt(i) = ZtNt(i) , (13)
where log(Zt/Z) = zt is an aggregate productivity shock with AR(1) process:
zt = ρzzt−1 + s
z
t . (14)
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0 < ρz < 1 and s
z
t is a normally distributed serially uncorrelated innovation with zero
mean and standard deviation σz .
In this context each firm i has monopolistic power in the production of its own good and
therefore it sets the price. Prices are sticky a` la Rotemberg (1982) so that firms face
quadratic resource costs for adjusting nominal prices according to:
θ
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
)2
, (15)
where θ is the degree of price rigidities.
The problem of the firm is then to choose {Pt(i), Nt(i)}
∞
t=0 to maximize the sum of ex-
pected discounted profits:
max
Nt(i),Pt(i)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
γt
γ0
{
Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i)− wtNt(i)−
θ
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
)2}
s.t. Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−ǫt
Yt = ZtNt(i) ,
(16)
where Yt = Ct +Gt and γt = C
o
t
−σ.
In equilibrium all firms will charge the same price, so that we can assume symmetry.
After defining mct as the real marginal cost, the first order condition are:
wt = mctZt (17)
0 = [1− (1−mct)ǫt]Yt − θ(πt − 1)πt + θβEt
(
Cot+1
−σ
Cot
−σ
)
(πt+1 − 1)πt+1 . (18)
Combining (17) with (4) and (7) yields to such an expression for the real marginal cost:
mct =
1
Zt
(λωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕCot
σ) . (19)
Then we combine it with (18) and get:
Cot
−σ(πt − 1)πt =
[
1−
(
1−
λωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕCot
σ
Zt
)
ǫt
]
ZtNtC
o
t
−σ
θ
+ βEtu
o
ct+1(πt+1 − 1)πt+1 .
(20)
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2.3 Government
The government is composed by a monetary authority which sets the nominal interest
rate Rt and a fiscal authority which determines the level of public expenditure Gt. We
assume a balanced budget requirement, supposing public consumption equals lump sum
taxes.
PtGt = PtTt . (21)
Defining aggregate lump sum taxes as Tt = λT
r
t + (1− λ)T
o
t , if the same amount of lump
sum taxes is withdrawn from each individual (T rt = T
o
t ), we obtain Gt = Tt = T
r
t = T
o
t .
2.4 Equilibrium
To close the model we consider also the goods market clearing condition
Zt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ] = λC
r
t + (1− λ)C
o
t +Gt +
θ
2
(πt − 1)
2 . (22)
A rational expectations equilibrium for the private sector consists of a plan {Crt , C
o
t , N
r
t , N
o
t , Pt}
satisfying (5), (6), (8), (20) and (22), given the policies {Gt, Tt, Rt ≥ 1}, the exogenous
processes ǫt, Zt and the initial conditions {R−1B−1, P−1}.
2.5 Calibration
As a baseline calibration for the following exercise, we follow Adam and Billi (2008). We
set β = 0.9913; the degree of price stickiness θ is 17.5; the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and labor supply elasticity are set to 1. We keep Adam and Billi (2008)’s
values for the utility weights (ωn = 26.042 and ωg = 0.227) and set the steady state values
for Zt and ǫt to 1 and 6 respectively, in line with the literature. The fraction of liquidity
constrained consumers is calibrated to be 0.5, following the estimates of Campbell and
Mankiw (1989) and Gal´ı, Lo`pez-Salido and Valle´s (2004). Finally, we set the coefficients
of persistence of the shocks to 0.9 and the standard deviations to 0.01.
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3 The policy problem
Following Adam and Billi (2008), we suppose that policymakers cannot commit but decide
about policies period by period. This behavior is called sequential decision making and is
suboptimal because it fails to fully internalize the welfare cost of generating inflation. In
fact policymakers are tempted to move output closer to its first-best level but they neglect
that the private sector is forward looking in its price decisions and rationally anticipates
current inflation.
3.1 The social planner
We start analyzing the first-best allocation, where we omit monopolistic distortions and
nominal rigidities. The social planner problem is then to solve:
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,Gt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)}
s.t. Zt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ] = λC
r
t + (1− λ)C
o
t +Gt
(23)
From the first order conditions we obtain:
Crt
−σ = Cot
−σ = ωgG
−σ
t = −
ωnN
r
t
ϕ
Zt
= −
ωnN
o
t
ϕ
Zt
(24)
which in steady state leads to:
Cr−σ = Co−σ = ωgG
−σ = ωnN
r
t
ϕ = ωnN
oϕ (25)
given that the steady state value of Zt is 1 (from now on, letters without time subscript
represent steady state values). In a way analogous to Adam and Billi (2008), this shows
that at a first-best level it is optimal to equate the marginal utility of private and public
consumption to the marginal disutility of labor effort. Moreover, the marginal utility of
private consumption and the marginal disutility of labor effort are equal for both types
of consumers.
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3.2 The Ramsey problem
We look now at the Ramsey problem, where the policy authorities fully cooperate and
can commit, which means that policymakers determine state-contingent future policies
at time zero. The Ramsey allocation also takes into account the presence of sticky prices
and monopolistic distortions. The problem is then to solve:
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Rt,Gt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)}
s.t. (5), (6), (8), (20), (21), (22) for all t .
(26)
3.2.1 Ramsey steady state
From the first order conditions we derive that the value of πt in steady state is 1, which
imply price stability. Combining this result with the Euler equation we find that R = 1/β.
Imposing the steady state also delivers the following result from (20):
w =
[
λ
ωnN
rϕ
Cr−σ
+ (1− λ)
ωnN
oϕ
Co−σ
]
=
ǫ− 1
ǫ
(27)
In steady state the real wage is constant with respect to the fraction of rule of thumb
consumers. Given the technological constraints, the real wage in steady state also cor-
responds to the real marginal costs, as stated by (17), resembling the equilibrium result
under flexible prices, where steady state real marginal costs equal the inverse of the de-
sired mark-up.
Given the complexity of the model, the steady state values of the other variables are ob-
tained through numerical methods, after calibrating parameters. An interesting result is
that these steady state values depend on the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers
λ. Table 1 resumes steady state values. Our model nests Adam and Billi (2008) model
for λ = 0. This allow us to compare our results to theirs.
We note that Co is an increasing function of λ and the reason is that when λ increases,
the fraction of Ricardians decreases so that per capita profits D/(1 − λ) rise, boost-
ing per capita Ricardian consumption. Liquidity constrained consumption slightly in-
creases as λ becomes greater than 0.3 due to a small reduction of G. In fact, given that
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G = T = T o = T r, from (6) we obtain Cr = wN r − G. It is easy to understand that
the more than proportional decrease in G with respect to N r causes Cr to rise, since the
steady state value of the real wage is constant. From the policy authority point of view,
it is optimal to reduce public spending to maximize welfare when λ increases, because
it rises Cr. At the same time both liquidity constrained and Ricardians hours worked
decrease, but No reduction is more consistent. This leads to a rise of aggregate labor,
given that the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers increases, which finally pushes
also output up.
3.2.2 Ramsey dynamics
We analyze the model dynamics in the case of Ramsey optimum through impulse response
functions. Figure 1 shows the effects of a positive technology shock. When a positive tech-
nology shock occurs (σzt = 0.01), the nominal rate of interest falls and public expenditure
rises on impact. Policymakers accommodate the shock to boost the economy by reduc-
ing nominal interest rates and raising public expenditure. Thus inflation remains around
its steady state (the shock would imply a fall in inflation but the expansive monetary
policy works reversely, through a raise of aggregate demand). In this case the author-
ities commit so that they are completely credible; this is why they can maintain price
stability in each period. Labor is not affected by this type of shock, while the real wage
and output jump remarkably at time zero. A rise in productivity moves the demand of
labor up but the increase of employment is offset by the expansive policy, which pushes
Ricardian consumption up; this in turn shifts the labor supply, so that real wages go up
while employment remains unchanged. Consumption jumps by the same amount for both
consumers. In fact, the real interest rate falls on impact causing Ricardian households
to consume more. At the same time liquidity constrained consumption is affected by the
fact that real wages react more than public consumption, boosting private consumption.
These characteristics are pretty much the same in Adam and Billi (2008) IRFs.
The effects generated by a negative mark-up shock (σǫt = 0.01) are more relevant. As
shown in figure 2, on impact inflation and the nominal rate of interest drop to increase
in the following periods but overshooting the equilibrium values and public spending
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jumps. Aggregate consumption and real wages fall slightly while aggregate labor (and
consequently output) are almost unchanged on impact. All these variables have an hump-
shaped path of adjustment. Liquidity constrained consumption follows a path similar to
aggregate consumption while Ricardian consumption has a reversed hump-shaped IRF.
N rt jumps and then follows a reversed hump-shaped path undershooting its steady state
value while Not fall slightly on impact. With a negative mark-up shock, there is a rela-
tive pressure on firms’ profits which are expected to diminish. This has a negative effect
on Ricardian consumption through (3). Monetary policymakers react optimally slightly
reducing the interest rate to sustain welfare. Public expenditure rises and, together with
real wage initial drop, make Crt fall; in the remaining periods the dynamics of C
r
t is de-
termined by that of wages.
There are great differences in comparison with Adam and Billi (2008), with respect to
policy optimal reactions. This happens for a big enough value of λ. For 0 ≤ λ < 0.42
the nominal interest rate jumps, while when λ ≥ 0.42 the optimal response of policy is
to reduce the interest rate. For higher values of λ, real wages are increasingly negatively
affected on impact, which dampens the response of consumption. For this reason, the
higher is the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers the more the interest rate will
be reduced on impact, causing Ricardian consumption to decrease less or even go up for
expansive enough monetary policy and Ricardian hours worked to reduce. Moreover, the
fact that inflation reduces (more than in Adam and Billi (2008) model) after such a shock
leaves room for the expansive monetary policy. At the same time, the impact on public
spending is significantly higher than in Adam and Billi (2008) and the effect of the shock
is reabsorbed after more periods. Thus, an increasing boost to public expenditure and
a greater reduction in interest rates is needed to sustain welfare. In turn, the higher
Gt makes liquidity constrained consumers consume less and work more but this effect
is counterbalanced by the fact that Gt increases welfare directly and a lower Rt induces
Ricardians to consume more.
Result 1. With a committed policymaker, the presence of liquidity constrained con-
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sumers induces a different optimal response of policy in face of a negative mark-up shock,
calling for a fall of nominal interest rates and a significant rise in public spending.
3.3 The policy game
In this section we impose the game structure to the policy decision-making. Monetary and
fiscal policy are independent and cannot commit so that their decisions on the nominal
interest rate and public expenditure are taken period by period (discretionally).
3.3.1 Nash game
We start with the case where the policy authorities decide simultaneously at the time of
implementation. Moreover, each policymaker takes as given the current policy choice of
the other, all future policies and future private-sector choices.
The problem of the fiscal authority is:
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Gt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)}
s.t. (5), (6), (8), (20), (21), (22) for all t
{Crt+j, C
o
t+j, N
r
t+j , N
o
t+j , πt+j , Rt+j−1 ≥ 1, Gt+j} given for j ≥ 1 .
(28)
The set of first order conditions define the behavior of the fiscal policymaker and thus,
implicitly its reaction function.
Analogously, the monetary authority solves the following problem:
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Rt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)}
s.t. (5), (6), (8), (20), (21), (22) for all t
{Crt+j , C
o
t+j, N
r
t+j , N
o
t+j , πt+j , Rt+j ≥ 1, Gt+j−1} given for j ≥ 1 .
(29)
Calculating the Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary and fiscal policy involves to
solve the first order conditions of both policy authorities and the constraints imposed
to obtain the policy functions Cr{Zt, ǫt}, C
o{Zt, ǫt}, N
r{Zt, ǫt}, N
o{Zt, ǫt}, π{Zt, ǫt},
R{Zt, ǫt}, G{Zt, ǫt}.
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3.3.2 Nash steady state
We find the steady state of the Nash game through numerical methods. In table 2 these
values are grouped.
As pointed out by Adam and Billi (2008), when the policy authorities play simultaneously
and under discretion there is an important inflation bias with respect to the Ramsey steady
state, which increases as λ increases. The intuition is that inflation is an implicit way
to tax Ricardians, whose per capita consumption increases due to a rise of per capita
profits D/(1 − λ). This inflation bias affects significantly per capita SS profits; in fact
this variable tends to increase for λ increasing but for λ > 0.5 this tendency breaks off
and, in particular, per capita SS profits become even negative (λ = 0.7) because of a too
high SS inflation which makes the cost of adjusting prices overcome Y − wN . Thus, the
rise of Ricardian consumption is dampened in favor of liquidity constrained consumption.
Moreover, we also find a government spending bias, which is more important the higher
is the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers, but for λ = 0.7 it reabsorbs.
3.3.3 Nash dynamics
Analyzing the dynamics of the simultaneous game, some differences emerge with respect
to the Ramsey problem. With regard to the technology shock (figure 3), we note that
the fact that policies do not cooperate produces a rise in inflation. As a matter of fact
inflation reaction comes from the fact that the policy game implies sequential policymak-
ing. The monetary policy is not forward looking, it decides period by period and thus
generates an inflation bias: the authority is tempted to stimulate demand by lowering
interest rates and the additional demand is satisfied by an increase of real wages, which
in turn drives inflation up. The nominal interest rate reduction is reflected on Cot which
jumps. Liquidity constrained labor jumps at impact while Ricardian and aggregate labor
fall, in line with the findings of Gal´ı and Rabanal (2004).
The IRFs relative to the mark-up shock are represented in figure 4 and are significantly
different from those of the Ramsey problem: they lose the hump-shaped path. A negative
mark-up shock affects primarily prices (negatively) and marginal costs (positively). In
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fact inflation falls and real wages, which in our model correspond to real marginal costs,
rise. The fiscal policy responds by reducing Gt on impact while monetary policymaker
decrease the interest rate. An interesting feature of these IRFs is that as long as the
private sector is forward looking, it is optimal for a policymaker that is committed (as in
Ramsey) to induce a period of inflation following a deflationary shock. In other words it
is optimal in these cases to have the inflation rate overshoot its SS: if the private sector
understands that the policymaker will act in this way, the future inflation will be incorpo-
rated into the private sector’s current deflationary expectations. The response of private
sector deflationary expectation to a deflationary shock will therefore be less pronounced
than it otherwise would have been, which in turn yields less actual deflation in the period
of the shock. In contrast, a monetary policymaker which optimizes under discretion (as in
the Nash game) cannot take advantage of this effect, since the private sector understands
that it will go back on the commitment of rising inflation once the initial reaction to the
shock has passed. This inability to carry out earlier commitments lies at the heart of the
sub-optimality of discretionary optimization and are clearly detected from inflation IRF.
With respect to Adam and Billi (2008) model the effects on policy variables are qual-
itatively equal, but quantitatively very different. The presence of liquidity constrained
consumers (λ = 0.5) involve a greater reaction of policy decision variables and conse-
quently a greater impact on private sector variables (with the exception of the real wage).
Liquidity constrained consumption rises due to the huge reduction of public spending
and the expansive monetary policy pushes Cot up. This puts pressure on the reduction
of hours worked and consequently of output. In particular, as λ increases the stronger
reactions of policymakers cause consumption of both types of consumers to rise more and
consequently labor supplies to decrease. When λ = 0 the impact effect on hours and
output is positive: the greater increase of real wages and the lower rise of consumption
cause labor supply to augment.
Moreover, if we increase the value of λ, we find that public spending jumps on impact
instead of reducing. This happens when λ ≥ 0.62. Our intuition about this is that when
the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers becomes relevant in the economy, optimal
policy implies a sort of social cost to pay in order to maximize welfare. In fact the rise
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of G induces a lower response of Cr. At the same time, as λ increases monetary policy
becomes more expansive, thus boosting Ricardian consumption. Overall, when the policy
authorities face a mark-up shock the rise of the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers
causes a redistribution of consumption from liquidity constrained to Ricardians.
Result 2. The presence of liquidity constrained consumers alters quantitatively the re-
action of policies when they are independent and play sequentially and simultaneously.
After a negative mark-up shock, interest rates have to reduce more while a larger decrease
of public consumption is needed. This also leads to a drop of hours worked and output.
In the case where the policy authorities have the same utility function, a game structure
such as a Stackelberg game does not matter on equilibrium and dynamics because con-
straints are the same and are always satisfied. The Stackelberg structure becomes relevant
when the utility function of the monetary or the fiscal authority changes. This is what
Adam and Billi (2008) suppose in their study. We follow their approach, generalizing
their analysis allowing for the presence of liquidity constrained consumers.
3.3.4 Nash game with conservative monetary policy
In this section we suppose that the monetary authority is more inflation averse than so-
ciety. The utility function of monetary policy becomes then:
(1− α) {λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)} − α
(πt − 1)
2
2
(30)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of monetary conservatism. α > 0 means that the monetary
authority dislikes inflation more than society and when α = 1 the policymaker is fully
conservative, so that it only cares about inflation. We may think that this assumption is
closer to the ECB’s mandate of maintaining price stability. The preferences of the fiscal
policymaker remain unchanged.
In this context the timing of the policy moves has an influence on the equilibrium out-
come. It is not clear in practice if the authorities act simultaneously or if one of two
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moves first, given also that the time of implementation and effectiveness of policies are
different.
First, we consider the case of simultaneous decisions. The fiscal problem remains (28),
while the monetary authority now solves the following:
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Rt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
(1− α)[λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)]− α
(πt − 1)
2
2
}
s.t. (5), (6), (8), (20), (21), (22) for all t
{Crt+j , C
o
t+j, N
r
t+j , N
o
t+j , πt+j , Rt+j ≥ 1, Gt+j−1} given for j ≥ 1 .
(31)
Finding the Nash equilibrium consists of solving the system of the constraints and the
first order conditions of fiscal policy and conservative monetary authority.
As before we calculate the steady state values. In this case we may have different values
depending on the calibration of λ and α. For brevity, we do not report all the possible
combinations, but only the SS values with α = 0.5 and λ varying. Actually the presence
of a conservative monetary policy (α = 0.5) is not so important in determining the SS
values: comparing them to those of the Nash equilibrium without conservative monetary
policy we can not identify differences before the forth decimal digit or more. Moreover,
other values of α ∈ (0, 1) does not change significantly the steady state. Setting α to
0.5 (so that the monetary authority assigns an equal weight to consumers utility and to
inflation stability), the presence of a fraction of liquidity constrained consumers has a
certain effect on the SS values (see table 3). Given the (un)importance of α, these values
vary in a way very similar to the Nash game without conservative monetary policy. With
regard to the dynamics we report IRFs for α = 0.5 in figures 5 and 6. We note that
variables react to both shocks in a way almost coincident with that of the Nash game of
the previous section. As such, in response to a technology shock Gt jumps and Rt drops,
determining a higher rise of inflation with respect to Adam and Billi (2008). A mark-up
shock causes a greater reaction of policy variables and inflation and lower effect on the
real wage, while aggregate labor and output drop instead of rising on impact.
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3.3.5 Stackelberg game with conservative monetary policy
Now we consider the situation where the game between the two authorities has a Stackel-
berg structure. In particular we concentrate on the case in which the fiscal policymaker is
the leader while the monetary policymaker is the follower. This means that fiscal policy
is determined before monetary policy and thus has to take into account the conservative
monetary policy reaction function, which consists of the first order conditions of (31).
The fiscal authority’s policy problem at time t is thus given by
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Rt,Gt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)}
s.t. (5), (6), (8), (20), (21), (22) FOCs of (31) for all t
{Crt+j , C
o
t+j, N
r
t+j , N
o
t+j , πt+j, Rt+j ≥ 1, Gt+j} given for j ≥ 1 .
(32)
We find the equilibrium solving for constraints and first order conditions of (32).
3.3.6 Fiscal leader steady state
Calculating the steady state, we observe that the fiscal leadership changes only marginally
the SS values with respect to the Nash case when α = 0.5. For this reason we do not
comment on them. More interesting is the case where α = 1, which means that the
monetary authority only cares about inflation. In this case the fiscal leadership leads to
the Ramsey steady state. This is the same result obtained in Adam and Billi (2008).
The fiscal authority takes into account that the monetary policymaker is determined to
achieve price stability at all costs, so that if there is a fiscal expansion it will rise interest
rate to contain inflationary pressures. The fiscal policymaker benefits of the first move
and therefore can internalize this effect, leading to the Ramsey steady state. This also
imply that the welfare losses are minimized, as we will show in the next section.
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3.3.7 Fiscal leader dynamics
For dynamics we can first observe figures 7 and 8. With α = 0.5, there are no significant
differences with the Nash game and this is also true for Adam and Billi (2008) model.
Therefore, we can assert that nor the presence of a conservative monetary policy nor the
type of game played have great influence on the dynamics; still, what is more relevant
is the presence of liquidity constrained consumers but in a way very similar to Nash.
Instead, when α = 1 figure 9 shows that a positive technology shock leads to the Ramsey
result. With respect to the non-completely conservative monetary policy, the monetary
policymaker reacts with a slightly stronger reduction in interest rates while fiscal policy
behaves in the same way. It is interesting to note that the presence of liquidity con-
strained consumers when α = 1 induces a different response of policy in face of a mark-up
shock with respect to Adam and Billi (2008) model: in figure 10, Gt rises on impact more
than in Adam and Billi (2008) model. In the Nash games public spending went down
on impact with both Adam and Billi (2008) and our model, even if with the presence
of liquidity constrained consumers the effect was much greater. Moreover, the monetary
authority slightly raises the interest rate, while Adam and Billi (2008) model points to a
significant reduction. The intuition is that in Adam and Billi (2008) model policymak-
ers look at aggregate variables so that the reduction in interest rates and the small rise
of public spending are enough to sustain consumption and welfare, while in our model
policymakers look at disaggregate variables: the rise of the interest rate concerns only Ri-
cardians, whose consumption is thus slightly reduced; the fiscal expansion is then greater
in order to maximize utility. This is possible because liquidity constrained consumption
is supported by the huge increase of real wages (as found by Gal´ı, Lo`pez-Salido and Valle´s
(2007)) so that Crt response does not change much and Gt can be used to boost welfare
without affecting liquidity constrained consumption. Aggregate hours worked change the
direction of impact with respect to the previous games and this is because Ricardian labor
rises. It is worth noting that when the monetary policy is fully conservative, price stabil-
ity is achieved in each period (inflation is not affected by the shock, which is completely
reflected in a rise of wages).
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By varying the value of λ when α = 1 we observe that monetary policy changes reaction
when λ ≥ 0.49 making Ricardians consumption fall. With the value of λ increasing mon-
etary policy becomes more and more restrictive, aggregate consumption and labor jump
less, while public spending is increasingly used to cope with a negative mark-up shock.
Result 3. When the monetary authority only cares about inflation (α = 1), the presence
of liquidity constrained consumers in a fiscal leader structure subject to a negative mark-
up shock leads to different optimal responses of policies with respect to the standard
model of Adam and Billi (2008). In particular Gt rises more on impact and the interest
rate is raised instead of reduced for high enough values of λ. This means that fiscal policy
is used more.
4 Welfare analysis
We now show a measure for the utility losses associated to a particular game structure
following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2006) and Adam and Billi (2008). We calculate the
percent loss of each game structure with respect to the Ramsey deterministic steady state.
Denote V DSS = λu(Cr, N r, G) + (1 − λ)u(Co, No, G) the period utility for the Ramsey
deterministic steady state and V A the stochastic steady state of the value function of
an alternative policy regime. The permanent reduction in private consumption, µA ≤ 0
(supposing to withdraw the same amount from each type of consumer), that would imply
the Ramsey deterministic steady state to be welfare equivalent to the alternative policy
regime can be found solving for µA the following expression:
V A =
1
1− β
[λ(log (Cr(1 + µA))− ωn
N r1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ ωg logG)
+ (1− λ)(log (Co(1 + µA))− ωn
No1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ ωg logG)] .
(33)
Therefore, we obtain:
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µA = exp{(1− β)(V A − V DSS)} − 1 . (34)
Table 6 shows the welfare losses in percentage terms resulting from Adam and Billi (2008)
model and the model with liquidity constrained consumers for each policy structure. What
we note is that in both cases the simple Nash equilibrium leads to a welfare loss which is
bigger than the cases where the monetary policy is conservative about inflation. Secondly,
while with Adam and Billi (2008) model there is no difference in losses between the Nash
equilibrium with conservative monetary policy and the fiscal leadership with conservative
monetary policy when α = 0.5, the welfare losses with our model are greater with the
fiscal leadership. Finally, the fiscal leader structure with α = 1 minimizes the deviation
from Ramsey allocations, as we could imagine due to the fact that the Ramsey steady
state is reached.
5 Conclusions
In this study we investigated the effects of the presence of a fraction of consumers who
cannot smooth consumption and have no access to state-contingent markets nor receive
dividends, on policy optimal dynamic responses. We compare our results to the the dy-
namic responses of the model of Adam and Billi (2008), which does not allow for the
presence of ‘liquidity constrained’ consumers. We concentrated on different structures for
policy decision making. After considering the Ramsey problem, we skip to game struc-
tures, assuming that there are two independent authorities which can play simultaneously
or not. The fiscal policy decides on the amount of public expenditure while the monetary
authority decides on the level of the nominal interest rate. For each problem we calcu-
lated the steady state and then analyzed the dynamics when the model was shocked by
a technological and a mark-up shock.
The main result is that the presence of liquidity constrained consumers alters at least
quantitatively the optimal response of policies after a negative mark-up shock. When
there are liquidity constrained consumers, the optimal responses of the fiscal policy call
for a bigger contraction of public spending with sequential policymaking while a higher
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fiscal expansion is needed under commitment or with fully conservative monetary author-
ity. With regard to the optimal responses of the monetary policy, the presence of liquidity
constrained consumers leads to a reduction of the nominal interest rate, which is more
pronounced when policies play under discretion, and to a small rise when the monetary
authority is fully conservative and the fiscal policy has the advantage of the first move
(while without liquidity constrained consumers in this case the monetary policy is expan-
sive). It is important to note that monetary policy changes response for λ ≥ 0.42 under
commitment: while Adam and Billi (2008) model points to a rise of the nominal interest
rate, in our model there is a monetary expansion. Moreover, for values of λ higher than
0.49, the fiscal leader structure with fully conservative monetary policy also leads to a
different result with respect to the benchmark model, that is to a monetary restriction.
When the policy authorities are focused on maximizing social welfare, a reduction in pub-
lic spending is often needed in order to support liquidity constrained consumption (which
would be dampened if not); at the same time, the monetary authority is mainly concerned
on sustaining Ricardian consumption. A policy authority which maximizes individuals’
utility function has to take into account both the movements in consumption of both
consumers and public expenditure, which in turn has a negative effect on liquidity con-
strained consumption, given that it is set equal to the amount of taxes levied. Precisely,
the fiscal policy cannot raise Gt without taking into account that this has a negative
effect on liquidity constrained consumption. These are the main channels through which
the presence of a limited asset market participation influences the economy and thus the
optimal reactions of the two policy authorities: the higher is λ the more public spending
reacts.
Moreover, optimal policy responses change direction and intensity with respect to the type
of game played. When the policy authorities act independently, simultaneously and under
discretion, their optimal reactions are greater on impact because they cannot internalize
neither private sector expectations nor the other policymaker’s action. With the fiscal
leader structure with fully conservative monetary policy, the sole purpose of the monetary
authority is to stabilize inflation, without taking into account individuals’ utility; this is
reflected on a weak response of the interest rate, which makes private sector expectations
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on inflation to be zero, thus achieving price stability in each period. Besides, in this case
fiscal policy can internalize the reaction of monetary policy, minimizing welfare losses as
pointed out in section 4.
We think this paper could give interesting insights on how economic policy should be
run, depending on how the structure of policy authorities is and taking into account the
presence of limited asset market participation, which may have increased recently due
to the financial crisis. Given that the presence of liquidity constrained consumers makes
the role of fiscal policy become more relevant, policymakers should probably rely more
on fiscal policy in periods of recession, in particular if the downturn originated from a
financial crisis, which is often associated with a worsening of the conditions of access to
financial markets.
Further developments of this study include the possibility of considering different fiscal
structures, given that the balanced budget requirement is a very simplifying assumption
and it is not always such a proper description of a country’s fiscal structure. First, we
would like to allow for different amounts of lump sum taxes to be levied on the different
types of consumers; secondly, we could consider the case of distortionary taxation; and
finally, it would be interesting to have the fiscal authority choosing the amount of public
debt. Besides, we may also think about having a game structure where there are several
fiscal authorities playing with a unique monetary authority, which is a case very close to
the EU context.
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Technical appendix
A The Ramsey Problem
The Langrangian of the Ramsey problem (26) is
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Rt,Gt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)
+γ1t [C
o
t
−σ(πt − 1)πt −
(1− ǫt)
θ
Cot
−σZt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]
−
ǫt
θ
[λN rt + (1− λ)N
o
t ]C
o
t
−σ[λωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕCot
σ]
− βEtC
o
t+1
−σ(πt+1 − 1)πt+1]
+γ2t
[
Cot
−σ
Rt
− βEt
Cot+1
−σ
πt+1
]
+γ3t
[
Zt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]− λC
r
t − (1− λ)C
o
t −Gt −
θ
2
(πt − 1)
2
]
+γ4t [N
o
t
ϕCot
σ −N rt
ϕCrt
σ]
+γ5t [C
r
t − wtN
r
t +Gt]}
The first order condition w.r.t. (Crt , N
r
t , C
o
t , N
o
t , πt, Rt, Gt) respectively are
λCrt
−σ−γ1t λ
ǫt
θ
NtσωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ−1Cot
−σ−γ3t λ+γ
4
tN
r
t
ϕσCrt
σ−1+γ5t (1−ωnN
r
t
ϕ+1σCrt
σ−1) = 0
(35)
− λωnN
r
t
ϕ + γ1t
λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ + ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ)]
+ γ3t λZt + γ
4
tϕN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ − γ5t ωnC
r
t
σN rt
ϕ(ϕ+ 1) = 0
(36)
(1− λ)Cot
−σ − (γ1t − γ
1
t−1)σC
o
t
−σ−1(πt − 1)πt − γ
1
t
Nt
θ
σCot
−σ−1[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωnλN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ]
− γ2t σ
Cot
−σ−1
Rt
+ γ2t−1σ
Cot
−σ−1
πt
− γ3t (1− λ)− γ
4
tN
o
t
ϕσCot
σ−1 = 0
(37)
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− (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕ + γ1t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn[λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ
+NtϕN
o
t
ϕ−1Cot
σ]] + γ3t (1− λ)Zt − γ
4
tϕC
o
t
σNot
ϕ−1 = 0
(38)
(γ1t − γ
1
t−1)C
o
t
−σ(2πt − 1) + γ
2
t−1C
o
t
−σπ2t − γ
3
t θ(πt − 1) = 0 (39)
−γ2t
Cot
−σ
R2t
= 0 (40)
ωgG
−σ
t − γ
3
t + γ
5
t = 0 (41)
A.1 Ramsey steady state
We impose the steady state and get
γ2 = 0 (42)
γ3 = ωgG
−σ + γ5 (43)
from (40) and (41). Then combining (42) with (39) we obtain
π = 1 (44)
Combining these results with (5) and (20) leads to
R =
1
β
(45)
and
w =
[
λ
ωnN
rϕ
Cr−σ
+ (1− λ)
ωnN
oϕ
Co−σ
]
=
ǫ− 1
ǫ
(46)
The steady state values of the other variables are obtained through numerical methods.
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B Nash policy game
B.1 Fiscal policy problem
The Lagrangian of the fiscal policy problem (28) is:
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Gt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)
+γ1t [C
o
t
−σ(πt − 1)πt −
(1− ǫt)
θ
Cot
−σZt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]
−
ǫt
θ
[λN rt + (1− λ)N
o
t ]C
o
t
−σ[λωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕCot
σ]
− βEtC
o
t+1
−σ(πt+1 − 1)πt+1]
+γ2t
[
Cot
−σ
Rt
− βEt
Cot+1
−σ
πt+1
]
+γ3t
[
Zt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]− λC
r
t − (1− λ)C
o
t −Gt −
θ
2
(πt − 1)
2
]
+γ4t [N
o
t
ϕCot
σ −N rt
ϕCrt
σ]
+γ5t [C
r
t − wtN
r
t +Gt]}
The first order condition w.r.t. (Crt , N
r
t , C
o
t , N
o
t , πt, Gt) respectively are
λCrt
−σ−γ1t λ
ǫt
θ
NtσωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ−1Cot
−σ−γ3t λ+γ
4
tN
r
t
ϕσCrt
σ−1+γ5t (1−ωnN
r
t
ϕ+1σCrt
σ−1) = 0
(47)
− λωnN
r
t
ϕ + γ1t
λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ + ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ)]
+ γ3t λZt + γ
4
tϕN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ − γ5t ωnC
r
t
σN rt
ϕ(ϕ+ 1) = 0
(48)
(1− λ)Cot
−σ − γ1t σC
o
t
−σ−1(πt − 1)πt − γ
1
t
Nt
θ
σCot
−σ−1[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωnλN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ]
− γ2t σ
Cot
−σ−1
Rt
− γ3t (1− λ)− γ
4
tN
o
t
ϕσCot
σ−1 = 0
(49)
− (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕ + γ1t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn[λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ
+NtϕN
o
t
ϕ−1Cot
σ]] + γ3t (1− λ)Zt − γ
4
tϕC
o
t
σNot
ϕ−1 = 0
(50)
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γ1tC
o
t
−σ(2πt − 1)− γ
3
t θ(πt − 1) = 0 (51)
ωgG
−σ
t − γ
3
t + γ
5
t = 0 (52)
B.2 Monetary policy problem
The Lagrangian of the monetary policy problem (29) is:
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Rt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)
+γ1t [C
o
t
−σ(πt − 1)πt −
(1− ǫt)
θ
Cot
−σZt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]
−
ǫt
θ
[λN rt + (1− λ)N
o
t ]C
o
t
−σ[λωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕCot
σ]
− βEtC
o
t+1
−σ(πt+1 − 1)πt+1]
+γ2t
[
Cot
−σ
Rt
− βEt
Cot+1
−σ
πt+1
]
+γ3t
[
Zt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]− λC
r
t − (1− λ)C
o
t −Gt −
θ
2
(πt − 1)
2
]
+γ4t [N
o
t
ϕCot
σ −N rt
ϕCrt
σ]
+γ5t [C
r
t − wtN
r
t + L
r
t ]}
The first order condition w.r.t. (Crt , N
r
t , C
o
t , N
o
t , πt, Rt) respectively are
λCrt
−σ−γ1t λ
ǫt
θ
NtσωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ−1Cot
−σ−γ3t λ+γ
4
tN
r
t
ϕσCrt
σ−1+γ5t (1−ωnN
r
t
ϕ+1σCrt
σ−1) = 0
(53)
− λωnN
r
t
ϕ + γ1t
λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ + ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ)]
+ γ3t λZt + γ
4
tϕN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ − γ5t ωnC
r
t
σN rt
ϕ(ϕ+ 1) = 0
(54)
(1− λ)Cot
−σ − γ1t σC
o
t
−σ−1(πt − 1)πt − γ
1
t
Nt
θ
σCot
−σ−1[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωnλN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ]
− γ2t σ
Cot
−σ−1
Rt
− γ3t (1− λ)− γ
4
tN
o
t
ϕσCot
σ−1 = 0
(55)
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− (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕ + γ1t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn[λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ
+NtϕN
o
t
ϕ−1Cot
σ]] + γ3t (1− λ)Zt − γ
4
tϕC
o
t
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ϕ−1 = 0
(56)
γ1tC
o
t
−σ(2πt − 1)− γ
3
t θ(πt − 1) = 0 (57)
−γ2t
Cot
−σ
R2t
= 0 (58)
In steady state (42) and (43) still hold, but there is no more price stability (π > 1). In
this case all other steady state values are obtained through numerical methods.
C Nash policy game with conservative monetary pol-
icy
The fiscal policy problem (28) is unchanged.
Instead, the monetary policy problem becomes:
max
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,πt,Rt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt{(1− α)[λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)]− α
(πt − 1)
2
2
+γ12t [C
o
t
−σ(πt − 1)πt −
(1− ǫt)
θ
Cot
−σZt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]
−
ǫt
θ
[λN rt + (1− λ)N
o
t ]C
o
t
−σ[λωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕCot
σ]
− βEtC
o
t+1
−σ(πt+1 − 1)πt+1]
+γ13t
[
Cot
−σ
Rt
− βEt
Cot+1
−σ
πt+1
]
+γ14t
[
Zt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]− λC
r
t − (1− λ)C
o
t −Gt −
θ
2
(πt − 1)
2
]
+γ15t [N
o
t
ϕCot
σ −N rt
ϕCrt
σ]
+γ16t [C
r
t − wtN
r
t +Gt]}
The first order condition w.r.t. (Crt , N
r
t , C
o
t , N
o
t , πt, Rt) respectively are
(1−α)λCrt
−σ−γ12t λ
ǫt
θ
NtσωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ−1Cot
−σ−γ14t λ+γ
15
t N
r
t
ϕσCrt
σ−1+γ16t (1−ωnN
r
t
ϕ+1σCrt
σ−1) = 0
(59)
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− (1− α)λωnN
r
t
ϕ + γ12t
λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ + ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ)]
+ γ14t λZt + γ
15
t ϕN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ − γ16t ωnC
r
t
σN rt
ϕ(ϕ+ 1) = 0
(60)
(1− α)(1− λ)Cot
−σ − γ12t σC
o
t
−σ−1(πt − 1)πt − γ
12
t
Nt
θ
σCot
−σ−1[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωnλN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ]
− γ13t σ
Cot
−σ−1
Rt
− γ14t (1− λ)− γ
15
t N
o
t
ϕσCot
σ−1 = 0
(61)
− (1− α)(1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕ + γ12t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn[λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ
+NtϕN
o
t
ϕ−1Cot
σ]] + γ14t (1− λ)Zt − γ
15
t ϕC
o
t
σNot
ϕ−1 = 0
(62)
γ12t C
o
t
−σ(2πt − 1)− γ
14
t θ(πt − 1)− α(π − 1) = 0 (63)
−γ13t
Cot
−σ
R2t
= 0 (64)
Solving for the steady state we find analogously:
γ13 = 0 (65)
γ3 = ωgG
−σ + γ5 (66)
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D Fiscal leadership with conservative monetary pol-
icy
The Lagrangian of the fiscal policy problem (32) is:
max
Cr
t
,Nr
t
,Co
t
,No
t
,πt,Gt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{λu(Crt , N
r
t , Gt) + (1− λ)u(C
o
t , N
o
t , Gt)
+γ1t [C
o
t
−σ(πt − 1)πt −
(1− ǫt)
θ
Cot
−σZt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]
−
ǫt
θ
[λN rt + (1− λ)N
o
t ]C
o
t
−σ[λωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕCot
σ]
− βEtC
o
t+1
−σ(πt+1 − 1)πt+1]
+γ2t
[
Cot
−σ
Rt
− βEt
Cot+1
−σ
πt+1
]
+γ3t
[
Zt[λN
r
t + (1− λ)N
o
t ]− λC
r
t − (1− λ)C
o
t −Gt −
θ
2
(πt − 1)
2
]
+γ4t [N
o
t
ϕCot
σ −N rt
ϕCrt
σ]
+γ5t [C
r
t − wtN
r
t +Gt]
+γ6t [(1− α)λC
r
t
−σ − γ12t λ
ǫt
θ
NtσωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ − 1Cot
−σ − γ14t λ+ γ
15
t N
r
t
ϕσCrt
σ−1
+ γ16t (1− ωnN
r
t
ϕ+1σCrt
σ−1)]
+γ7t [−(1− α)λωnN
r
t
ϕ + γ12t
λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ
+ ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ)] + γ14t λZt + γ
15
t ϕN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ − γ16t ωnC
r
t
σN rt
ϕ(ϕ+ 1)]
+γ8t [(1− α)(1− λ)C
o
t
−σ − γ12t σC
o
t
−σ−1(πt − 1)πt − γ
12
t
Nt
θ
σCot
−σ−1[Zt(ǫt − 1)
− ǫtωnλN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ]− γ13t σ
Cot
−σ−1
Rt
− γ14t (1− λ)− γ
15
t N
o
t
ϕσCot
σ−1]
+γ9t [−(1− α)(1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕ + γ12t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn[λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ
+ (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ +NtϕN
o
t
ϕ−1Cot
σ]] + γ14t (1− λ)Zt − γ
15
t ϕC
o
t
σNot
ϕ−1]
γ10t [γ
12
t C
o
t
−σ(2πt − 1)− γ
14
t θ(πt − 1)− α(πt − 1)]
γ11t [−γ
13
t
Cot
−σ
R2t
]}
The first order conditions w.r.t. (Crt , N
r
t , C
o
t , N
o
t , πt, Rt, Gt, γ
12
t , γ
13
t , γ
14
t , γ
15
t , γ
16
t ) are then
respectively
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λCrt
−σ − γ1t λ
ǫt
θ
NtσωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ−1Cot
−σ − γ3t λ+ γ
4
tN
r
t
ϕσCrt
σ−1 + γ5t [1−N
r
t
ϕ+1ωnσC
r
t
σ−1]
+ γ6t [−σ(1− α)λC
r
t
−σ−1 − γ12t
ǫt
θ
λNtC
o
t
−σωnσN
r
t
ϕ(σ − 1)Crt
σ−2 + γ15t σN
r
t
ϕ ∗ (σ − 1)Crt
σ−2
− γ16t ωnσN
r
t
ϕ+1(σ − 1)Crt
σ−2] + γ7t [−γ
12
t
λ
θ
Cot
−σǫtωn(ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1σCrt
σ−1 + λN rt
ϕσCrt
σ−1)
+ γ15t ϕN
r
t
ϕ−1σCrt
σ−1 − γ16t ωnN
r
t
ϕ(ϕ+ 1)σCrt
σ−1] + γ8t [γ
12
t
Nt
θ
σCot
−σ−1ǫtλωnN
r
t
ϕσCrt
σ−1]
+ γ9t [−γ
12
t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σǫtωnλN
r
t
ϕσCrt
σ−1] = 0
(67)
− λωnN
r
t
ϕ + γ1t [
λ
θ
Cot
−σZt(ǫt − 1)− ǫωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ + ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ)]
+ γ3t λZt + γ
4
tϕN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ − γ5t ωnC
r
t
σN rt
ϕ(ϕ+ 1)
+ γ6t [−γ
12
t
ǫt
θ
λCot
−σωnσC
r
t
σ−1(λN rt
ϕ +NtϕN
r
t
ϕ−1) + γ15t σC
r
t
σ−1ϕN rt
ϕ−1
− γ16t ωnσC
r
t
σ−1(ϕ+ 1)N rt
ϕ]
+ γ7t [−(1− α)λωnϕN
r
t
ϕ−1 − γ12t
λ
θ
Cot
−σǫtωn(ϕC
r
t
σ(λN rt
ϕ−1 +Nt(ϕ− 1)N
r
t
ϕ−2) + λCrt
σϕN rt
ϕ−1)
+ γ15t ϕC
r
t
σ(ϕ− 1)N rt
ϕ−2 − γ16t ωn(ϕ+ 1)C
r
t
σϕN rt
ϕ−1]
+ γ8t [γ
12
t
σ
θ
Cot
−σ−1ǫtωnλC
r
t
σ(λN rt
ϕ + ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1)]
+ γ9t [−γ
12
t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σǫωnλC
r
t
σϕN rt
ϕ−1] = 0
(68)
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(1− λ)Cot
−σ − γ1t σC
o
t
−σ−1(πt − 1)πt − γ
1
t
Nt
θ
σCot
−σ−1[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωnλN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ]
− γ2t σ
Cot
−σ−1
Rt
− γ3t (1− λ)− γ
4
tN
o
t
ϕσCot
σ−1 + γ6t [γ
1
t 2
ǫt
θ
λωnσ
2NtN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ−1Cot
−σ−1]
+ γ7t [γ
12
t
λ
θ
(−σCot
−σ−1(Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫωn(ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ + λN rt
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ))
− Cot
−σǫtωn(1− λ)N
o
t
ϕσCot
σ−1)] + γ8t [−σ(1− α)(1− λ)C
o
t
−σ−1
+ γ12t (πt − 1)πtσ(σ + 1)C
o
t
−σ−2 + γ12t
Nt
θ
σ(σ + 1)(Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫλωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ)Cot
−σ−2
+ γ13t σ(σ + 1)
Cot
−σ−2
Rt
− γ15t σN
o
t
ϕ(σ − 1)Cot
σ−2] + γ9t [γ
12
t
1− λ
θ
(−σCot
−σ−1(Zt(ǫt − 1)
− ǫtωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ +NtϕN
o
t
ϕ−1Cot
σ))− Cot
−σǫtωn((1− λ)N
o
t
ϕσCot
σ−1
+ ϕNtN
o
t
ϕ−1σCot
σ−1))− γ15t ϕN
o
t
ϕ−1σCot
σ−1]− γ10t γ
12
t (2πt − 1)σC
o
t
−σ−1
+ γ11t γ
13
t
σCot
−σ−1
R2t
= 0
(69)
− (1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕ + γ1t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn[λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ
+NtϕN
o
t
ϕ−1Cot
σ]] + γ3t (1− λ)Zt − γ
4
tϕC
o
t
σNot
ϕ−1 + γ6t [−γ
12
t
ǫt
θ
λCot
−σωnσN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ−1(1− λ)]
+ γ7t [−γ
12
t λθC
o
t
−σǫtωn(ϕN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ(1− λ) + (1− λ)Cot
σϕNot
ϕ−1)]
+ γ8t [−γ
12
t
σ
θ
Cot
−σ−1(1− λ)(Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫλωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ)− γ15t σC
o
t
σ−1ϕNot
ϕ−1]
+ γ9t [−ϕ(1− α)(1− λ)ωnN
o
t
ϕ−1 − γ12t
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σǫωn((1− λ)C
o
t
σϕNot
ϕ−1
+ ϕCot
σ(Not
ϕ−1(1− λ) +Nt(ϕ− 1)N
o
t
ϕ−2))− γ15t ϕC
o
t
σ(ϕ− 1)Not
ϕ−2] = 0
(70)
γ1tC
o
t
−σ(2πt−1)−γ
3
t θ(πt−1)+γ
8
t (−γ
12
t σC
o
t
−σ−1(2πt−1))+γ
10
t (2γ
12
t C
o
t
−σ−γ14t θ−α) = 0
(71)
−γ2t
Cot
−σ
R2t
+ γ8t γ
13
t
σCot
−σ−1
R2t
+ γ11t γ
13
t
2Cot
−σ
R3t
= 0 (72)
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ωgG
−σ
t − γ
3
t + γ
5
t = 0 (73)
− γ6t λ
ǫt
θ
NtσωnN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ−1Cot
−σ + γ7t
λ
θ
Cot
−σ(Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ
+ ϕNtN
r
t
ϕ−1Crt
σ))− γ8t σC
o
t
−σ−1(πt − 1)πt − γ
8
t
Nt
θ
σCot
−σ−1(Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫωnλN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ)
+ γ9t [
1− λ
θ
Cot
−σ[Zt(ǫt − 1)− ǫtωn(λN
r
t
ϕCrt
σ + (1− λ)Not
ϕCot
σ +NtϕN
o
t
ϕ−1Cot
σ)]
+ γ10t C
o
t
−σ(2πt − 1) = 0
(74)
−γ8t
σCot
−σ−1
Rt
− γ11t
Cot
−σ
R2t
= 0 (75)
λ(γ7tZt − γ
6
t ) + (1− λ)(γ
9
tZt − γ
8
t )− γ
10
t θ(πt − 1) = 0 (76)
N rt
ϕCrt
σ(γ6t
σ
Crt
+ γ7t
ϕ
N rt
)−Not
ϕCot
σ(γ8t
σ
Cot
+ γ9t
ϕ
Not
) = 0 (77)
γ6t − ωnC
r
t
σN rt
ϕ(γ6t
σN rt
Crt
+ γ7t (ϕ+ 1)) = 0 (78)
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Tables and graphs
AB λ = 0 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2 λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7
Cr 0.1445 0.1446 0.1446 0.1446 0.1447 0.1448 0.1449 0.1450
Co 0.1600 0.1619 0.1642 0.1673 0.1715 0.1776 0.1871 0.2039
C 0.1600 0.1600 0.1602 0.1603 0.1605 0.1608 0.1612 0.1618 0.1627
N r 0.2214 0.2214 0.2213 0.2213 0.2212 0.2211 0.2209 0.2207
No 0.2000 0.1977 0.1949 0.1913 0.1866 0.1802 0.1711 0.1570
N 0.2000 0.2000 0.2001 0.2002 0.2003 0.2004 0.2007 0.2010 0.2016
G 0.0400 0.0400 0.0400 0.0399 0.0398 0.0397 0.0395 0.0393 0.0389
π 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
R 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087
rr 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087
Y 0.2001 0.2001 0.2001 0.2002 0.2003 0.2005 0.2007 0.2010 0.2016
w 0.8335 0.8335 0.8335 0.8335 0.8335 0.8335 0.8335 0.8336 0.8336
Do 0.0333 0.0333 0.0371 0.0417 0.0477 0.0557 0.0669 0.0838 0.1120
V -354.5 -354.5 -354.6 -354.8 -355.0 -355.2 -355.6 -356.1 -357.0
Z 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003
ǫ 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016
Table 1: Ramsey problem stochastic steady state values
AB λ = 0 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2 λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7
Cr 0.1448 0.1449 0.1449 0.1450 0.1451 0.1453 0.1455 0.1461
Co 0.1593 0.1608 0.1625 0.1645 0.1665 0.1675 0.1633 0.1451
C 0.1593 0.1593 0.1592 0.1590 0.1586 0.1579 0.1564 0.1527 0.1458
N r 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2212
No 0.2014 0.1996 0.1975 0.1952 0.1931 0.1921 0.1973 0.2227
N 0.2014 0.2014 0.2017 0.2023 0.2031 0.2044 0.2068 0.2118 0.2216
G 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402 0.0403 0.0403 0.0400
π 1.0146 1.0146 1.0165 1.0189 1.0222 1.0268 1.0341 1.0464 1.0641
R 1.0234 1.0234 1.0253 1.0278 1.0311 1.0358 1.0431 1.0555 1.0733
rr 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0090 0.0090 0.0091 0.0093
Y 0.2014 0.2014 0.2018 0.2023 0.2032 0.2045 0.2068 0.2119 0.2217
w 0.8354 0.8354 0.8356 0.8359 0.8364 0.8369 0.8379 0.8393 0.8413
Do 0.0313 0.0313 0.0343 0.0376 0.0414 0.0451 0.0468 0.0380 -0.0023
V -355.7 -355.7 -356.1 -356.7 -357.7 -359.1 -361.7 -367.4 -378.9
Z 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003
ǫ 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016
Table 2: Nash game stochastic steady state values
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AB λ = 0 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2 λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7
Cr 0.1448 0.1448 0.1449 0.1450 0.1449 0.1453 0.1456 0.1461
Co 0.1593 0.1608 0.1625 0.1645 0.1664 0.1677 0.1636 0.1452
C 0.1593 0.1593 0.1592 0.1590 0.1586 0.1578 0.1565 0.1528 0.1458
N r 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2217 0.2214 0.2214 0.2212
No 0.2013 0.1995 0.1975 0.1952 0.1931 0.1918 0.1970 0.2225
N 0.2013 0.2013 0.2017 0.2023 0.2031 0.2046 0.2066 0.2117 0.2216
G 0.0403 0.0403 0.0403 0.0403 0.0403 0.0406 0.0401 0.0403 0.0400
π 1.0144 1.0144 1.0163 1.0187 1.0220 1.0266 1.0338 1.0461 1.0640
R 1.0233 1.0233 1.0252 1.0276 1.0309 1.0356 1.0428 1.0553 1.0732
rr 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0090 0.0090 0.0091 0.0093
Y 0.2014 0.2014 0.2018 0.2023 0.2032 0.2046 0.2067 0.2117 0.2216
w 0.8354 0.8354 0.8356 0.8359 0.8363 0.8369 0.8378 0.8393 0.8413
Do 0.0314 0.0314 0.0343 0.0377 0.0415 0.0454 0.0471 0.0386 -0.0020
V -355.7 -355.7 -356.1 -356.7 -357.6 -359.0 -361.6 -367.2 -378.8
Z 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003
ǫ 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016
Table 3: Nash game with conservative monetary policy stochastic steady state values
(α = 0.5)
AB λ = 0 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2 λ = 0.3 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.6 λ = 0.7
Cr 0.1448 0.1449 0.1449 0.1450 0.1451 0.1453 0.1455 0.1461
Co 0.1593 0.1608 0.1626 0.1645 0.1666 0.1676 0.1636 0.1452
C 0.1593 0.1593 0.1592 0.1590 0.1587 0.1580 0.1565 0.1528 0.1458
N r 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2215 0.2212
No 0.2013 0.1995 0.1975 0.1952 0.1930 0.1919 0.1970 0.2225
N 0.2013 0.2013 0.2017 0.2023 0.2031 0.2044 0.2067 0.2117 0.2216
G 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402 0.0402 0.0403 0.0403 0.0400
π 1.0144 1.0144 1.0163 1.0187 1.0220 1.0266 1.0338 1.0461 1.0640
R 1.0233 1.0233 1.0252 1.0276 1.0309 1.0356 1.0428 1.0553 1.0732
rr 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0090 0.0090 0.0091 0.0093
Y 0.2014 0.2014 0.2018 0.2023 0.2031 0.2044 0.2067 0.2117 0.2216
w 0.8354 0.8354 0.8356 0.8359 0.8363 0.8369 0.8378 0.8393 0.8413
Do 0.0314 0.0314 0.0343 0.0377 0.0415 0.0453 0.0471 0.0386 -0.0020
V -355.7 -355.7 -356.1 -356.7 -357.6 -359.0 -361.6 -367.2 -378.8
Z 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003 1.0003
ǫ 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016 6.0016
Table 4: Fiscal leadership with conservative monetary policy stochastic steady state values
(α = 0.5)
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AB α = 1,λ = 0.5
Cr 0.1448
Co 0.1776
C 0.1600 0.1612
N r 0.2211
No 0.1802
N 0.2000 0.2007
G 0.0400 0.0395
π 1.0000 1.0000
R 1.0087 1.0087
rr 0.0087 0.0087
Y 0.2001 0.2007
w 0.8335 0.8335
Do 0.0334 0.0669
V -354.5 -355.6
Z 1.0003 1.0003
ǫ 6.0016 6.0016
Table 5: Fiscal leadership with conservative monetary policy stochastic steady state values
(α = 1)
AB λ = 0.5
Ramsey -0.0009% -0.0011%
Nash -1.0314% -5.1803%
Nash with α = 0.5 -1.0129% -5.0906%
Fiscal leadership with α = 0.5 -1.0129% -5.0953%
Fiscal leadership with α = 1 -0.0011% -0.0021%
Table 6: Welfare losses from Ramsey allocations in consumption equivalents
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Figure 1: Ramsey IRFs to a positive technology shock
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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Figure 2: Ramsey IRFs to a negative mark-up shock
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
39
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
aggr consumption
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
Ricardian consumption
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
LC consumption
0 10 20 30 40
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
aggr labor
0 10 20 30 40
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
Ricardian labor
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
4
x 10−3 LC labor
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
inflation
0 10 20 30 40
−0.4
−0.2
0
nom interest rate
0 10 20 30 40
−1
−0.5
0
real interest rate
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
public spending
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
output
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
real wage
Figure 3: Nash IRFs to a positive technology shock
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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Figure 4: Nash IRFs to a negative mark-up shock
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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Figure 5: Nash IRFs to a positive technology shock with conservative monetary policy
and α = 0.5
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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Figure 6: Nash IRFs to a negative mark-up shock with conservative monetary policy and
α = 0.5
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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Figure 7: IRFs to a positive technology shock with fiscal leadership, conservative monetary
policy and α = 0.5
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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Figure 8: IRFs to a negative mark-up shock with fiscal leadership, conservative monetary
policy and α = 0.5
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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Figure 9: IRFs to a positive technology shock with fiscal leadership, conservative monetary
policy and α = 1
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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Figure 10: IRFs to a negative mark-up shock with fiscal leadership, conservative monetary
policy and α = 1
Notes: solid line for the model, dotted line for AB. Percentage variations from the steady
state are shown. For inflation and interest rates annualized absolute variations are repre-
sented.
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